One of the standard objections to AI is that although it may say something useful about cognitive processes, such as perception, inference, and planning, it says nothing about other aspects of mind, such as motivation and emotions. In particular, AI programs tend to be given a single `top-level' goal, and everything they do is subservient to this, whereas people have a large number of different wishes, likes, dislikes, hopes, fears, principles, ambitions, all of which can interact with the processes of deciding and planning, and even such processes as seeing physical objects or understanding a sentence. This is correct and important.
There are ways of extending the design so as to begin to cope with this sort of complexity, without leaving a computational framework. Questions to be addressed include, What sorts of processes can produce new motives? How should motives be represented? What sorts of processes could select motives for action? How should one motive (e.g., a fear or preference) interact with the process of trying to achieve another? In order to answer these questions we must clarify what we understand by the key terms. This requires conceptual analysis.